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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. MeGough"
The survey year' produced a wide array of appellate opinions with no
discernible area of focus. Of particular interest were decisions holding
that the relocation of a custodial parent is not alone grounds to change
custody and that notice of trial by publication alone contravenes the due
process rights of a pro se litigant in a divorce action in which custody of
minor children is at issue. A resident can sue for divorce and an award
of Georgia property even though the nonresident spouse has never been
in the state. However, a resident cannot enforce a foreign divorce decree
when the nonresident's only Georgia contact is via mail and telephone.

I. DIVORCE
A.

Alimony
In Metzler v. Metzler,2 the jury awarded the wife alimony in the
amounts of fifty thousand dollars in the first year, forty thousand dollars
in years two through four, and thirty thousand dollars in the fifth and
final year. The alimony was to be paid in twelve equal payments per
year and to cease only upon the death of either party. The Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's
final divorce decree that provided only monthly payments and added
termination events of the remarriage or cohabitation of the wife.3
The court held that "parties themselves are free to contract for the
automatic termination of alimony in the event of cohabitation."4

* Barry B. McGough, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. University of California at Berkeley (A.B.,
1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966). Member, State Bar of Georgia. The author
is appreciative of the assistance of Catharine C. Young in preparing this Article.
1. This Article digests cases decided between June 1, 1996 and May 31, 1997.
2. 267 Ga. 892, 485 S.E.2d 459 (1997).
3. Id. at 892, 485 S.E.2d at 460.
4. Id. at 893, 485 S.E.2d at 461 (citing Quillen v. Quillen, 265 Ga. 779, 462 S.E.2d 750
(1995)).
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However, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 19-619(b)5 does not require termination or reduction of alimony obligations.8
Because the husband and wife had not agreed to terminate alimony in
the event of the wife's cohabitation, the trial court could not impose that
limitation in the final decree!
The Supreme Court of Georgia held it was without jurisdiction to
entertain the husband's appeal from an interlocutory order awarding
temporary alimony in Bailey v. Bailey.' The husband had filed an
application for discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35(a)(2)
for review of the award of alimony made by the trial court.9
The supreme court held that although O.C.G.A. section 5-6-35 provides
for discretionary review of awards granting or denying temporary
alimony, a party was "not excuse[d]" from obtaining a certificate of
immediate review under O.C.G.A. section 5-6-34(b).1" Because the
husband had not complied with the requirements of the interlocutory
appeal procedure, the court was without jurisdiction."
B. Enforcement of Settlement Agreements
On an interlocutory appeal from an order denying the motion of the
husband to enforce a settlement agreement, the Supreme Court of
Georgia in Mathes v. Mathes 2 held that ineffective assistance of
counsel was not a defense and remanded the case to the trial court.18
The court held the defense of ineffective counsel was only applicable in
criminal, not civil, cases.' 4
In Kendricks v. Childers,5 the Supreme Court of Georgia held valid
a settlement agreement that allowed for cost of living increases in child

5. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(b) (1991 & Supp. 1997) in the relevant portion states:
Subsequent to a final judgment of divorce awarding periodic payment of alimony
for the support of a spouse, the voluntary cohabitation ofsuch former spouse with
a third party in a meretricious relationship shall also be grounds to modify
provisions made for periodic payments of permanent alimony for the support of
the former spouse.
6. 267 Ga. at 893, 485 S.E.2d at 461 (citing Allen v. Allen, 265 Ga. 53, 54, 452 S.E.2d
767, 768 (1995)).
7. Id (citing Donaldson v. Donaldson, 262 Ga. 231, 232, 416 S.E.2d 514, 515 (1992)).
8. 266 Ga. 832, 471 S.E.2d 213 (1996).
9. Id. at 832, 471 S.E.2d at 213 (citing O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(aX2) (1995 & Supp. 1997)).
10. Id. at 833,471 S.E.2d at 215 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 5-6-34(b) and 5-6-35(a)(2) (1995 &
Supp. 1997)).
11. Id.
12. 267 Ga. 845, 483 S.E.2d 573 (1997).
13. Id. at 845-46, 483 S.E.2d at 574-75.
14. Id. at 845, 483 S.E.2d at 574.
15. 267 Ga. 98, 475 S.E.2d 604 (1996).
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support payments because it was specific and did not contravene a
policy. 6 The trial court had found the
statute or violate public
17
provision unenforceable.
The court found this increasing payment provision did not contravene
O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15.'8 The court stated: "While the guidelines
create a rebuttable presumption of the correctness of the statutory
formula, parents are free to exceed this level of support ... just as the
trier of fact may exceed the guidelines amount under O.C.G.A. § 19-615(c)."' 9 Because the provision was specific in amount, did not contravene O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15, and did not violate public policy, the court
enforced the agreement.2"
EquitableDivision
In deciding the identity of the beneficiary of annuity benefits payable
from the Survivor Benefits Plan ("SBP") of a United States Air Force
retiree, the Supreme Court of Georgia in King v. King)' held the
divorce decree awarding the first wife an annuity was preempted by
federal law.22 The annuity had accrued during the husband's first
marriage and was awarded to his first wife when they divorced. He
subsequently remarried, and upon his death the annuity was paid to his
second wife. The trial court awarded the annuity to the first wife on the
basis of the divorce decree, and the supreme court reversed.'
The SBP annuity accrued during the first marriage and therefore was
marital property subject to equitable division in the divorce.24 However, entitlement to benefits from the SBP is also governed by 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1447-1455.' Although state law governs domestic relations issues,
federal law preempts state law when the state law squarely conflicts
with the express terms of the federal law and "'its consequences
sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal program.'" 26 The court
cited 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(3) and subsequent amendments that clearly
specified the conditions under which a former spouse could become the
C.

16. Id. at 99, 475 S.E.2d at 606.
17. Id. at 98, 475 S.E.2d at 605.
18. Id. at 99, 475 S.E.2d at 606 (citing O.C.GA. § 19-6-15 (1991 & Supp. 1997)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. 225 Ga. App. 298, 483 S.E.2d 379 (1997).
22. Id. at 302, 483 S.E.2d 383.
23. Id. at 298-99, 483 S.E.2d at 380-81.
24. Id. at 300, 483 S.E.2d at 382.
25. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455 (1994)).
26. Id. at 301,483 S.E.2d at 382 (citing Stumpfv. Stumpf, 249 Ga. 759,760,294 S.E.2d
488, 490 (1982) (quoting McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 221 (1981))).
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beneficiary.27 The conditions called for either the retiree or spouse to
notify the government secretary of who would be the beneficiary
Because neither the husband nor the first wife complied with the
statute, enforcing the state law divorce decree would conflict with the
express provisions of the federal law. Accordingly, the second wife was
entitled to the annuity."8
The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court in
Starrett v. Commercial Bank of Georgia,' ordering the wife either to

convey her interest in certain property to the bank or to sell the property
and use the proceeds to satisfy the debt."0 The husband's interest in
the property was transferred to the bank in lieu of foreclosure after the
husband's death. The bank later sued the wife for repayment of the
outstanding debt. 1
The property had been marital property, and the parties' divorce
decree provided that the property would be sold and the proceeds used
to satisfy the husband's outstanding debt to the bank. After the divorce
the property was not sold, and the debt was not paid. The court held
that the effect of the divorce decree was to make the bank a third-party
beneficiary of the decree. The court mandated that the wife convey her
interest
to the bank or sell the property and apply the proceeds to the
32
debt.

D. Jury Trial

In Franklinv. Franklin,' the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the
final judgment of the trial court based on the findings of an auditor
because the wife had demanded and not waived her right to a jury
trial." The trial court had referred the case to an auditor who conducted an evidentiary hearing and made findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The wife appeared without counsel, objected to the appointment of
the auditor, and requested a jury trial.3 5 The court held that the wife
had validly exercised her right to request a jury trial pursuant to
O.C.G.A. section 19-5-1(a) and that although the trial court has the
power to refer the case to an auditor pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-7-2,

27. Id. at 300, 483 S.E.2d at 381 (citing 10 U.S.C. § 1450(f)(3) (1984)).
28. Id. at 302, 483 S.E.2d at 383.
29.

226 Ga. App. 598, 486 S.E.2d 923 (1997).

30. Id. at 598, 486 S.E.2d at 924.
31. Id.
32. Id., 486 S.E.2d at 925.

33. 267 Ga. 82, 475 S.E.2d 890 (1996).
34. Id. at 82, 475 S.E.2d at 890.
35. Id.
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it may not do so when there has been a proper demand for a jury
trial. 0
E. Jurisdiction
The most controversial decision in the past term was Abernathy v.
Abernathy.37 The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court
ruling that it had jurisdiction over the marriage and property of a
husband who resided in Georgia for almost a year, even though the wife
had never resided or been present in the state.3 The supreme court
held that the trial court had jurisdiction over the res of the marriage and
in rem jurisdiction over the property located in Georgia and therefore did
not need in personam jurisdiction over the wife.8
The husband and wife were married in Florida and resided in
Louisiana until they separated. The husband moved to Georgia and
after approximately one year filed a petition seeking divorce and an
award of property located within Georgia.4° The supreme court rejected
the wife's objection to personal jurisdiction and held that O.C.G.A.
section 9-10-91"' ("Long Arm Statute") did not apply because personal
jurisdiction was not required in a divorce case and that the trial court
had both in rem jurisdiction over the property located in Georgia and
jurisdiction over the marital res. 42
The dissents of Justices Sears and Fletcher vehemently attacked the
majority position and contended that the Long Arm Statute itself
requires personal jurisdiction in actions for divorce." Further, the
United States Supreme Court decisions in Shaffer v. Heitner" and
International Shoe Co. v. Washington' require a minimum contacts
analysis to ensure basic fairness to the defendant." Both Justices
found that the defendant wife had no minimum contacts with the state
and that jurisdiction was improperly exercised. 7

36. Id. at 83-84, 475 S.E.2d 891-92 (citing O.C.G.AL §§ 19-5-1(a) (1991 & Supp. 1997)
and 9-7-2 (1982)).
37. 267 Ga. 815, 482 S.E.2d 265 (1997).
38. Id. at 819, 482 S.E.2d at 269.

39. I&
40. Id. at 815-16, 482 S.E.2d at 266.
41. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (1982 & Supp. 1997).

42. 267 Ga. at 816-17, 482 S.E.2d at 267.
43. Id. at 821, 482 S.E.2d at 270 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); Id. at 821, 482 S.E.2d at 270
(Sears, J., dissenting).
44. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
45. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
46. 267 Ga. at 819-22, 482 S.E.2d at 269-71.
47. Id. at 820, 827, 482 S.E.2d at 269, 274.
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In Riersgard v. Morton," the trial court improperly exercised Long
Arm Statute jurisdiction in domesticating a foreign divorce decree and
attempting to enforce the child support provisions by contempt.4 9 The
Supreme Court of Georgia noted "the use of interstate communications"
was insufficient to confer jurisdiction. 0
The parties were divorced in Virginia; the wife moved to Georgia, and
the husband moved to Nevada. The wife brought suit in Georgia to
domesticate the foreign divorce decree and have the husband found in
contempt for nonpayment of child support. The husband was properly
served in Nevada."' The court rejected the wife's argument that the
husband had purposely availed himself of the laws of Georgia by writing
letters and speaking on the telephone with his children.52 The court
said:
Jurisdiction cannot be conferred solely from the use of interstate
communications because they are insufficient to rise to the level of
"minimum contacts" necessary to confer jurisdiction. Holding otherwise
would render state jurisdictional analysis moot, as every person who
picks up the phone or a pen to communicate with a nonresident would

subject themselves to the laws of the nonresidents state.'
In Norowski v. Norowski, 4 the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed
the decision of the trial court and held that even if the trial court did not
have jurisdiction over the issue of child custody, Uniform Superior Court
Rule ("U.S.C.R.") 24.7" 5 did not preclude it from hearing the petition for
divorce." The wife sued the husband for divorce, child custody, and
support in Mississippi while the parties lived there. The wife moved to
Georgia while the case was pending. Thereafter, the Mississippi court
denied both parties' request for divorce, and both appealed. The wife
sued the husband for divorce in Georgia and personally served him while
he was within the state.57 The supreme court held that contestable
issues under U.S.C.R. 24.7 were "those that are pending before the court

48. 267 Ga. 451, 479 S.E.2d 748 (1997).
49. Id. at 451, 479 S.E.2d at 749.
50. Id. at 453, 479 S.E.2d at 751.

51. Id. at 451, 479 S.E.2d 749 (1997).
52.

Id. at 453, 479 S.E.2d at 750-51.

53. Id., 479 S.E.2d at 751.
54. 267 Ga. 841, 483 S.E.2d 577 (1997).
55. UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 24.7 (1997). Uniform Superior Court Rule 24.7 provides in
relevant part that "no divorce decree shall be granted unless all contestable issues in the
case have been finally resolved."
56. 267 Ga. at 841, 483 S.E.2d at 577 (citing UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 24.7 (1997)).
57. Id. at 841-42, 483 S.E.2d at 577-78.
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and over which the court is authorized to exercise jurisdiction.'M The
court found that once the trial court determined that it did not have
jurisdiction of child custody, that issue was no longer contestable under
U.S.C.R. 24.7 and did not preclude the trial court from hearing the
divorce petition.59
II.

A

CHILDREN

Child Support
In Department of Human Resources v. Money,' the Georgia Court of

Appeals reversed the trial court and dismissed the putative father's
counterclaim.6 ' The court held the final divorce decree that denied
paternity did not prohibit the Department of Human Resources ("DHR")
from attempting to establish paternity 2
The divorce decree between the husband and wife incorporated a
contract between them in which the parties agreed that the husband did
The court of appeals held the agreement
not father the child.'
between the husband and wife did not bar DHR from seeking to
establish paternity because the agency represented the child, not the
mother.' Therefore, the court rejected the putative father's defense of
res judicata.65

In Smith v. Georgia Department of Human Resources," the Georgia
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that res judicata did
not prevent a putative father from reopening a consent order to pay child
support.6 7 The putative father had entered into a consent order to pay
child support for both children on the basis of his good-faith belief that
his relationship with the mother was monogamous." After hearing
rumors of the mother's infidelity and learning from a subsequent blood
test that one of the children could not have been his, the putative father
sought to reopen the consent order to change his child support requirement.69 The court of appeals held that the putative father's motion was

58.

Id at 842, 483 S.E.2d at 578 (citing UNIF. SUP. CT. R. 24.7 (1997)).

59. Id.
60.

222 Ga. App. 149, 473 S.E.2d 200 (1996).

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 150, 473 S.E.2d at 201.
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.
226 Ga. App. 491, 487 S.E.2d 94 (1997).
Id. at 492, 487 S.E.2d at 95.
Id,
Id
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"in substance an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence," 0 that the six factors enumerated in Roddenberry
determination of the motion, and that res
v. Roddenberry7' controlled
72
judicata did not apply.
In Morris v. Morris, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's award of attorney fees.74 The trial court awarded the husband
attorney fees after the wife voluntarily dismissed her complaint to
domesticate a foreign divorce decree and modify child support.75
The court found that although O.C.G.A. section 19-6-19(d) 76 authorizes attorney fees to be awarded to the prevailing party, the case had not
been determined by a trier of fact. 77 Because the wife had voluntarily
dismissed her child support modification claim, there was no prevailing
party and the husband was not entitled to attorney fees. 78
In Ferguson v. Ferguson,9 the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed
the trial court's dismissal of the mother's action under O.C.G.A. section
19-6-15(e) and (f), thus extending child support payments after the child
had turned eighteen. 0 The trial court had granted the father's motion
to dismiss, which alleged that child support should not be extended
because the motion to extend was filed after the child turned eighteen,
postmajority support was not awarded by the temporary or final order,
and the separate maintenance order was entered into before the effective
date of O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15(e).8 '
In rejecting all claims made in the motion to dismiss, the court held
that a claim for extended support under O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15(e)8 2

70. Id.
71.

255 Ga. 715, 342 S.E.2d 464 (1986).

72. 226 Ga. App. at 493,487 S.E.2d at 96 (citing Roddenberry v. Roddenberry, 255 Ga.
715, 342 S.E.2d 464 (1986)).
73. 222 Ga. App. 617, 475 S.E.2d 676 (1996).
74. Id. at 618, 475 S.E.2d at 677.
75. Id. at 617, 475 S.E.2d at 677.
76. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-19(d) (1991 & Supp. 1997) provides in part that "[in proceedings
for the modification of alimony for the support of a spouse or child... the court may award
attorneys' fees, costs, and expenses of litigation to the prevailing party as the interests of
justice may require."
77. 222 Ga. App. at 618, 475 S.E.2d at 677 (citing O.C.GJ.A § 19-6-19(d)).
78. Id.
79. 267 Ga. 886, 485 S.E.2d 475 (1997).
80. Id. at 887, 485 S.E.2d at 476-77 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(e), (f) (1991 & Supp.
1997)).
81. Id. at 886-87, 485 S.E.2d at 476 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(e)).
82. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(e) provides in part:
[Iln any temporary or final order for child support ... entered on or after July 1,
1992, the trier of fact ... may direct either or both parents to provide financial
assistance to a child who has not previously married or become emancipated, who
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does not have to be made before the child's eighteenth birthday because
there is no such explicit statement in the statute." Moreover, the court
held such a ruling is contrary to the legislative policy encouraging
children to complete secondary education.'"
The court also found the trial court was not authorized to require the
temporary or final order to include language extending child support
because the statute did not so require." Although the separate
maintenance agreement was entered into prior to the effective date of
O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15, the final judgment and decree of divorce, which
superseded the separate maintenance agreement, came after the
effective date of the statute; thus, the statute was applicable."
Child Custody
In Galvez v. Galvez, 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's denial of a motion to dismiss without an evidentiary hearing."
The complaint filed by the father sought to domesticate a foreign divorce
decree and change custody, alleging that jurisdiction was based on the
emergency provisions of O.C.G.A. section 19-9-43(a)(3)(B)" because the
minor daughter had been molested by the boyfriend of the mother.'
The parties were divorced in Florida. Thereafter, the father moved to
Georgia, and the mother moved to North Carolina.9 1 The court of
appeals held that the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing
because the mother had factual evidence that disputed the basis for
emergency jurisdiction." The court noted that in order for the trial
court to have jurisdiction, even under the emergency jurisdiction
B.

is enrolled in and attending a secondary school, and who has attained the age of
majority before completing his or her secondary school education, provided that
such financial assistance shall not be required after a child attains 20 years of age.
83. 267 Ga. at 887, 485 S.E.2d at 476 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(e)).
84. Id.
85. Id., 485 S.E.2d at 476-77.
86. Id. at 887-88, 485 S.E.2d at 477 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15).
87. 221 Ga. App. 644, 472 S.E.2d 492 (1996).
88. Id. at 645, 472 S.E.2d at 493.
89. O.C.G. § 19-9-43(a)(3XB) (1991) provides:
A court of this state which is competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination by initial or modification decree
if... tilt is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise neglected
or dependent.
90. 221 Ga. App. at 644, 472 S.E.2d at 492-93 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-43(aX3XB)).
91. Id., 472 S.E.2d at 492.
92. Id. at 645, 472 S.E.2d at 493.
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provisions of O.C.G.A. section 19-9-43(a)(3)(B), it would first have to
domesticate the foreign divorce decree."
In In re R.R.,94 the Georgia Court of Appeals vacated the custody
modification made by the trial court. 5 The trial court changed the sole
custody award to joint legal custody, with the father to have physical
custody if he remained in the county and, if not, for physical custody to
go to the mother."
Originally, the mother consented to the original custody award to the
father because she was in a recovery program for alcoholics. However,
the mother sought to change custody because she was a recovered
alcoholic and the father's sudden and unannounced relocation out of
state rendered her liberal visitation rights meaningless.' The court of
appeals held that absent any other evidence, the father's lack of notice
of his relocation was not by itself a material change in circumstances but
merely a factor to be considered. More important, the court held that
relocation of the custodial parent was not by itself a material change of
Rather, the adverse
circumstances authorizing a modification."
a
factor the trial court
a
child
was
on
emotional impact of relocation
°
that
the trial court may
noted
court
also
The
could consider."
consider the mother's progress as a recovering alcoholic as an improvement in her health under O.C.G.A. section 19-9-1(a), 0 1 and as a factor
in her favor.10 2
In In re M.M.,'" the trial court was without emergency jurisdiction
to consider the father's change of custody claim even though the trial
court had found the child may have been sexually abused. 1' The
parties were divorced in Georgia, and the custodial mother moved out of
state. After receiving a letter from the director of the child's school
describing incidents when the child had exposed himself and engaged in
other inappropriate behavior, the father refused to return the child to
the mother. 05 Because the trial court did not find that the child had
been abused sexually or physically, the court of appeals held that it was

93.

Id (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-43(aX3XB)).

94. 222 Ga. App. 301, 474 S.E.2d 12 (1996).
95.
96.

Id. at 306, 474 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 302-03, 474 S.E.2d at 15.

97. Id. at 301-02, 474 S.E.2d at 14-15.
98. Id. at 305, 474 S.E.2d at 16.
99. Id., 474 S.E.2d at 17.
100. Id. at 305, 474 S.E.2d at 16.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(a) (1991 & Supp. 1997).
222 Ga. App. at 304, 474 S.E.2d at 16.
222 Ga. App. 313, 474 S.E.2d 53 (1996).
Id. at 315, 474 S.E.2d at 55.
Id. at 313-14, 474 S.E.2d at 54-55.

1997]

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

145

error to exercise emergency jurisdiction pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 199-43(a)(3)(B).' ° "[Tihe trial court must be convinced that its intervention is necessary to protect the child."1 7
In Steed v. Deal,' the Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court decision to award joint custody but reversed the physical custody
In the father's modification, the trial court had
arrangement.'"
and physical custody with physical custody
legal
joint
awarded
of
July.110
first
every
alternating
The father, a North Carolina resident, had been granted visitation
rights in the previous paternity action, and the child had lived with the
father for over two years." Although neither party requested it, the
court of appeals found the trial court was authorized to award joint
custody when it concluded that both parties were fit and equally capable
of caring for the child."' The court reversed the physical custody
award because the record contained clear evidence that the arrangement
was not in the best interest of the child."5
In Crenshaw v. Crenshaw,"4 the Supreme Court of Georgia held that
notice of trial by publication alone violated the mother's due process
rights and reversed the decision of the trial court." The mother was
without counsel after her attorney withdrew. The judgment of the trial
court denied the wife's claim for alimony, gave the mother custody of the
daughter, and reduced the temporary award of child support." 6
The notice of withdrawal filed by the wife's counsel stated that
"services of notices will be made upon the client at her last known
address" and included the correct address of the mother." 7 The
supreme court held that because the trial court knew the mother was
appearing pro se and knew her correct address and because the action
involved children, she did not receive adequate notice of the trial
calendar when it was published in the county newspaper, and the
106. Id at 315, 474 S.E.2d at 55 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-43(a)(3XB)).
107. Id.
108. 225 Ga. App. 35, 482 S.E.2d 527 (1997).
109. Id. at 35, 37, 482 S.E.2d at 528-29.
110. Id. at 35, 482 S.E.2d at 527-28.
111. Id., 482 S.E.2d at 528.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 36-37, 482 S.E.2d at 529. The court instructed the trial court to "'exercise
its discretion [and) to look to and determine solely what is for the best interest of the
child'" pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(a)(2). Id. at 37, 482 S.E.2d at 529 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 19-9-3(aX2) (1991 & Supp. 1997)).
114. 267 Ga. 20, 471 S.E.2d 845 (1996).
115. Id. at 20, 471 S.E.2d at 845.
116. Id., 471 S.E.2d at 846.
117. Id. (citations omitted).
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service thus violated due process. 1 The dissent noted that prior court
decisions and O.C.G.A. section 9-11-40(c) both provide that publication
of the trial calendar in the official county newspaper is adequate notice
and there are neither case nor statutory exceptions for pro se litigants
in a divorce action involving children."
III. CONTEMPT
The trial court order adding a corporate third party in a contempt
action was reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Richwood &
Associates, Inc. v. Osborne.20 The wife had filed a motion for contempt
for the husband's failure to pay alimony and sought to join his employer
121
as a party.
The wife's complaint alleged that the employer conspired with her
former husband to frustrate her attempts to enforce the parties' divorce
decree.' 2 In reversing, the supreme court held the employer could not
be joined as a party because the contempt action was not a new action
but merely an action ancillary to the divorce."2 Because the employer
was not a party to the divorce, it could not be joined. 4
In Brown v. King,125 the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial
court decision that a thirty-day notice is required for a contempt
hearing.'w The trial court granted the motion to dismiss by the
husband, who had received 12seventeen
days' notice of the hearing on his
7
wife's motion for contempt.
The supreme court reiterated its position "that an application for
contempt is a motion and not a complaint"" because it does not come
under the O.C.G.A. section 9-11-7(a) definition of a pleading and,
therefore, must be considered a motion under O.C.G.A. section 9-117(b).'
As a motion, the court reasoned that U.S.C.R. 39.2, which

118. Id. at 21, 471 S.E.2d at 846.
119. Id. at 23-24, 471 S.E.2d at 847-48 (Carley, J., dissenting) (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-1140(c) (1993)).
120. 267 Ga. 89, 475 S.E.2d 606, 607 (1996).
121. Id. at 89, 475 S.E.2d at 607.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 266 Ga. 890, 472 S.E.2d 65 (1996).
126. Id. at 890, 472 S.E.2d at 65.
127. I&
128. 1d&at 890 n.2, 472 S.E.2d at 65 n.2 (citing Baer v. Baer, 263 Ga. 574, 436 S.E.2d
6 (1993); Phillips v. Brown, 263 Ga. 50, 426 S.E.2d 866 (1993); Opatut v. Guest Pond Club,
254 Ga. 258, 327 S.E.2d 487 (1985); Hines v. Hines, 237 Ga. 755, 229 S.E.2d 744 (1976);
McNeal v. McNeal, 233 Ga. 836, 213 S.E.2d 845 (1975)).
129. Id. at 890, 472 S.E.2d at 65 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-7(a), (b) (1993)).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

1997]

147

requires thirty days' notice of a hearing for a new civil action, does not
apply. 3° The court held the defendant husband was entitled to
reasonable notice and that seventeen days was reasonable. 3
IV.

LEGISLATION

The Georgia General Assembly has exempted child support and
alimony judgments from the dormancy and revival rules. 32 Installments of alimony or child support that are due become judgments by
operation of law, entitled to full faith and credit, and are not modifiable
retroactively."8 In addition, O.C.G.A. section 19-6-26 was revised to
comport with 28 U.S.C. § 1738B concerning entry and modification of
child support orders.' 3 Moreover, genetic testing has replaced blood
tests in paternity actions," and jury trials are no longer available in
such cases."t

Finally, no new Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
("URESA") actions can be initiated after January 1, 1998.' 37 The
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act ("UIFSA") has replaced URESA
and encompasses alimony awards, paternity determinations, and child
support. in

130. Id. at 891, 472 S.E.2d at 66 (citing UNIF. SUP. Cr. R. 39.2 (1996)).
131. Id
132. O.C.G.A. § 9-12-60 (1997) (domestic judgments); O.C.GA. § 9-3-20 (1997) (foreign
judgments).
133. O.C.GA. § 19-6-17 (Supp. 1997).
134. Id. § 19-6-26.
135. Id. § 19-7-43.
136. Id. § 19-7-40.
137.

Id § 19-11-40.1.

138. Id. § 19-11-100 to -191.

